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Executive Summary
Every year, disasters tend to cause economic damages, human death, and environmental destruction. Despite technological improvements and increased knowledge, humanity is still struggling against disasters because they cannot either predict them or respond to them appropriately. Accordingly, disaster preparedness and management are the two topics that get the most attention in the era of electronic mass media and extensive research. On both national and global scales, regions suffering from disasters receive humanitarian aid that is required to decrease the distress. Still, it often happens that organizations are not able to respond promptly or transport the resources necessary for the ones in need. The current paper presents a thoughtful analysis of three specific disasters – the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami – to provide possible alternatives to the existing logistics-related disaster response solutions.
The current paper provides the readers with a detailed discussion of the recommendations intended to improve the existing state of affairs in the area of disaster responses. It is established that integrated logistics is the best choice for preventing resource shortage during emergencies, with four directives intended to be respected: (1) to prepare all facilities to both disasters and catastrophes, based on the idea that these two are different; (2) to step away from opportunistic purchases and only ensure spontaneous shipments and donations that contain high-value items; (3) to attract the community to disaster management activities; and (4) to utilize social media to connect with the local community and disseminate vital information. The implementation plan for the above recommendations consists of four essential stages: (a) identification of essential resources, (b) identification of all secure facilities, (c) identification of appropriate response times, and (d) identification of the required number of local emergency resource facilities.
Introduction
Irrespective of the type of disaster affecting the society, the value of the community’s ability to adapt to emergencies grows continually. This means that the majority of fatalities and injuries (in addition to material losses) are linked to the inability to respond to disasters in a preventive manner or at least reduce the damage caused by natural calamities. Knowing that disaster management requires individuals and organizations to address the periods prior, during, and after disasters, it may be safe to conclude that logistics is one of the most critical industries for disaster response experts. The key objective of disaster management is to address huge economic and physical losses that may be expected in the case of inactivity. Another reason to consider logistics is the ability to speed up the reconstruction process through quicker goods delivery. When all operations are completed on time, it helps different organizations ensure that all the goods and equipment are delivered the fastest. The current study reviews the experiences of disaster management and develops a set of recommendations intended to help organizations positively exploit logistics and expedite the recovery process without additional expenditures.
Haiti Earthquake
Background
In 2010, the entire world felt sadness for Haiti and the Dominican Republic, countries located within the Caribbean on the island of Hispaniola. On January 12th, 2010, a massive earthquake hit about 15 miles from Port-au-Prince and had an initial shock that registered a magnitude of 7.0 and then they experienced two aftershocks, one measuring 5.9 and the other measuring 5.5 with several more aftershocks to come in the following days including one measuring 5.9 (Pallardy, 2010). This disaster killed over 300,000 people with several more left injured, missing and homeless as buildings had collapsed everywhere. An estimated 3 million people were impacted by this earthquake in one way or another, and several landmark buildings were destroyed or damaged such as the Presidential Palace, the National Assembly building and the Port-au-Prince Cathedral. Haiti is known for being a very poor country which many speculate is why so many buildings collapsed- a lack of building codes and proper requirements taken into consideration when structures were built, but it is hard to say whether or not any building could survive an earthquake of that magnitude. Exhibit A represents a graph that shows the perceived shaking each area received showing the regions of Port-au-Prince and Carrefour feeling the largest shock and then areas in the Dominican Republic would have felt moderate shaking caused by the earthquake.
Government
Haiti’s government was also severely impacted by this disaster with 14 out of 16 government ministries being destroyed, killing several government official’s lives including the head of mission of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Cecchine et al. 2013). This is a critical fact about the Haiti Earthquake because without the support of a well functioning government, relief efforts become even more difficult to successfully implement and coordinate with other countries from a logistics point of view. The local government are the “professionals” in that country or region, so they are the ones who would be able to work most effectively with neighbouring countries such as the U.S. to create a plan to provide relief during a crisis situation such as this. Due to the implications of the earthquake that resulted in so many deaths in Haiti government ministries, logistics planning became a very difficult task for the U.S. and other aids as there was a significant lack of communication and support available from the Haiti government. The surviving members of the Haiti government contacted the U.S. government with Barack Obama as the president at the time, for assistance. The U.S. government responded by agreeing to offer assistance and created a separate joint task force to help provide relief and soon became a key factor in what was known as “the largest international humanitarian response to a natural disaster in U.S. history” (Cecchine et al. 2013). Relief missions immediately faced issues in Haiti as the destruction was widespread including the destruction of air landing strips and seaports. This meant that there was a lot of difficulty with the delivery of high volume amounts of essential items needed for relief so one of the top priority items on the list was to clear and reopen the airport and the seaport in Port-au-Prince so that supplies could arrive in Haiti quicker and in larger amounts. Although the U.S. was just one of the countries that offered assistance in this natural disaster, they were the largest contributor in terms of personnel that were sent to help and other capabilities such as supplies provided, so for the purpose of this analysis the U.S. will be examined with their responsive efforts. Although the joint task force was created to help Haiti, it was not created to bring Haiti back to its pre-earthquake condition, but rather help control near-term suffering and work on relief efforts with other organizations who were also helping. Haiti was not in a great position prior to the earthquake so because the severe damages that occurred because of the earthquake with buildings destroyed everywhere, loved ones lost or killed, people injured and the government not being in a great financial position to begin with, Haiti was left in a miserable state. With the lack of long term support planned and executed by the home country and neighbouring countries, many citizens were left with nothing.
Problems in the Disaster Response Efforts
The very first logistics issue that the U.S had with trying to provide relief for Haiti was with vehicle routes, meaning trying to get the U.S. military and other aid into Haiti with their vehicles so they could start providing relief. Communications were very limited as it was severly damaged by the earthquake, so all that was known was that the seaports were destroyed and the airport was closed. The Port-au-Prince international airport was closed and the control tower was also not able to operate, so the U.S. military had no idea if it was safe to land an aircraft there or not. Of course, having the runway open was essential to the relief plan so that not only U.S. military aircraft could land, but aircraft from other organizations needed to be able to use the runway as well. So the U.S. sent one aircraft there and once it landed safely just 26 hours after the earthquake, it had the runway open and running less then an hour after they arrived (Cecchine et al. 2013). Once the teams were able to get into Haiti, they then proceeded to the most affected areas and started working through the different phases that needed to be handled such as rescuing survivors, treating and evacuating the injured, delivering water, food, shelter and supplies, restoring essential services and facilities, and supporting long-term recovery efforts (Cecchine et al. 2013).
Another logistics issue to note is that “Nine months after the Earthquake about 1.3 million people still lived in tents and informal shelter in the Port-au-Print metro area, indicative of the lack of access to any better options” (Sheller, 2012). This indicates that there were issues with logistics coordination for support post immediate relief efforts. Unfortunately, these people lived in extremely poor conditions due to the consequences of the earthquake and there was not enough logistics coordination for long term support and it seems as though there was really only a focus on what the U.S. could do in the short term. This created long term issues for the residents especially when considering the state their government had come to after the devastating deaths of many of the Haiti government representative deaths. Some of the issues that these citizens had even months after the earthquake were not limited to shelter but extended to not having clean drinking water, lack of bodily security and sanitation. There was a lot of money investeed in this aid mission by not only the U.S. military but also from other organizations such as the redcross- both of which can be considered as relatively wealthy. Of course, the salvation army is a not for profit organization, but the funds are there so that they can help in situations like these. Although organizations like these did a lot of work for Haiti when this disaster came to light, they may not have done their logistics planning effectively with regards to distribution of money and essential items like food, water and shelter. Some felt that a lot of money was spent on the volunteers who went to Haiti to help with the rescue mission, in order to keep them comfortable. Of course, it was very important that the volunteers were comfortable and safe so that they could continue contributing to the rescue mission- but it is possible that the money was not effectively distributed between helping the citizens reach some sense of normalcy and their accommodations. In addition, there was thousands and thousands of units of essential items shipped to Haiti such as food and water, but whether it was distributed properly was questionable as so many citizens went without.
Alternatives
It is important to analyze the possible alternatives that Haiti could have chosen to proceed with after the aid from neighboring countries dwindled. The first alternative would be to do nothing and make no adjustments for future potential natural disasters and the logistics planning needed for human relief aid should anything occur again in the future. This alternative is obviously not a reasonable alternative as there was still over a million citizens living in horrendous conditions without basic human rights such as shelter and clean drinking water. Therefore, it would not have been a good course of action to proceed with because it is the general understanding that the government should be doing all that they can to help support and protect their citizens in situations like this. The second alternative would have been for the Haiti government to do more logistics planning themselves for post natural disaster support of its citizens and contact neighboring countries for financial support so that they could use those funds to help its citizens to return to safer living conditions. This would require that the Haiti government be in a position that they could handle the logistics of executing a plan to distribute the necessary goods, have the ability to return buildings to their prior state, and create temporary safe living spaces for their citizens while they work on ways to restore the country. This alternative would be very difficult as Haiti was not a wealthy country prior to the earthquake, so they would need substantial financial support from wealthier neighboring countries like the U.S. after they just provided substantial means of support to Haiti. In addition to this, wealthier countries may be hesitant on financially helping a country whose government has just lost over a dozen of its members, resulting in that formation becoming severely unstable. The third alternative would have been to have a better plan in place prior to the earthquake. It is not uncommon for this part of the world to experience natural disasters like this, so it would have been better if Haiti had a plan in place prior to this natural disaster that would allow for easier flow of logistics planning with regards to support, vehicle routes being available, distribution of essential items and other supports needed. Of course, this alternative was of no help after the Haiti earthquake had already happened, but it is a good learning experience to develop such a plan to be more prepared for the next time should something like this ever occur again. The Haiti government could take it upon themselves to develop an agreement with neighboring countries about how planning can take place, what ports they can use or any other alternatives should those ports be closed due to such a natural disaster, and the most effective ways to distribute essential services and goods. It is a good idea to have these things set in place prior to a natural disaster happening because as we have seen in this case, communications can be cut off and challenged to reach other countries and communicate important information. Another reason why it is so important is because as we saw in the case with Haiti, their government was severely compromised when there were 14 members killed during the tragedy. If the government were to have a plan set in place prior to the disaster, the necessary information needed to be communicated with other countries could have been done before there were so many deaths within their government. It is also important to consider long term support, and how it could have been handled better in this disaster. We understand that the U.S. military who played the largest role in relief to Haiti was only temporary and did not look to restore the country to its pre-existing state prior to the earthquake. Due to this, the citizens suffered, and lived in terrible living conditions without basic human rights being satisfied. There is an obvious need for better logistics planning for long term support, not just short term, immediate survival support.
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami
Background
On December 26, 2004, a 9.2 magnitude earthquake created a powerful tsunami that transformed the cities surrounding the Indian Ocean. Not only did this tsunami change the lives of the affected areas, but it would also change how logistics for humanitarian efforts would be performed. At the time, this was the most destructive tsunami in recorded history; an estimated death toll of 230,000 people even though the actual number will never be known due to the devastation in the area and the number of people who were carried out to sea (Mills, 2014). Aside from the death toll, there were 1.7 million people displaced and forced to live in refugee camps. Although the area was known to be an earthquake “hotspot”, there was no technology in the area to warn of incoming tsunami waves which was a contributing factor to the size of devastation that the tsunami brought to the affected areas. The affected area was immense in size as it expanded from Indonesia to India to Somalia, the size of the affected area can be seen in exhibit B. Roads were completely removed from the face of earth, buildings destroyed, cities flooded, vehicles crushed, houses washed away, and water and food contaminated. As one can imagine, the relief effort was going to be massive and needed to be efficient and effective to stop the death toll from climbing due to secondary effects such as hunger, thirst, and diseases (Mills, 2014).
Each natural disaster is preparation for the next, one country really does not know how prepared or ready they are logistically for a disaster response until the disaster hits. In the aftermath, lessons can be learned as to what went wrong and things that need to be improved on to lessen the effect a natural disaster has on an area. Disaster response logistic activities can be broken down into two categories; preparedness and post-disaster (Heaslip & Barber, 2014). Preparedness in disaster response refers to the ability of governments, professional response organizations, communities and individuals to anticipate and respond effectively to the impact of likely, imminent or current hazards, events or conditions (HumanitarianResponse). The activities in the preparedness involve using mitigation measures such as positioning of critical supplies, development of response plans, and heightened building codes (Holguin-veras et al., 2013). The post-disaster activities can be broken down into the immediate relief efforts and the long-term recoveries. The immediate relief efforts refer to the activities that happen immediately after the disaster has occurred, while the long-term recoveries are the efforts and work that happens for months and even years to build the impacted areas back to the original state (Kovacs & Spens, 2007).
Problems in the Disaster Response Efforts
There were problems evident in both phases of the disaster response for the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004, which was described as a “logistics nightmare” (Hoffman, 2005). This natural disaster was said to be one of the greatest logistic challenges of modern history with logistic efforts being stretched to their breaking points. From transportation bottlenecks, poor coordination, and buildup of supplies; a number of things went wrong during the relief efforts. That is not to say that the relief efforts were ineffective as they were successful; however, there is always room for improvement.
One of the greatest barriers that was noticed during the relief efforts, was the lack of coordination (Hoffman, 2005). There was a trickledown effect from the lack of coordination that led to other problems for the logistics of the disaster response that will be touched on later. Professionals have traced the poor coordination of the relief efforts back to the massive scope of the efforts. The scope was just too large for one organization to take on by itself. The affected area stretched over 11 different countries; not only is that a large area of land to aid, it also creates political problems (Mills, 2014). At the time, there was not a large number of humanitarian organizations established and there was not a specific disaster response logistics cluster of the United Nations that would be used in the more recent natural disasters. This led to a problem of cooperation amongst the companies that did come to aid the affected areas. This was an increase in competition amongst the aid agencies so they would not share all the information amongst each other (Perry, 2007). With a lack of large-scale humanitarian agencies existing, a lot of the relief efforts came from the militaries of foreign countries such as the United States, Australia and China. The coordination amongst the relief efforts was so poor that the militaries and groups that came to aid had to set up their camp far away from the disaster zone. Ultimately impeding the response times to certain locations and creating an inability to assess the full damage within the disaster zones (Hoffman, 2005).
The first indicator of the lack of coordination could be noticed at the airports, as experts say this was the first bottleneck in relief efforts. Supplies that were being shipped to the disaster zone were piling up at airports and not being transported to the disaster zones. The supplies became stranded and inaccessible, leaving 10’s of thousands of people not receiving the relief that they needed (Hoffman, 2005). Another major problem with the supplies was that the affected regions were receiving such large donations of equipment and supplies that they were receiving unnecessary goods, this led to a supply-chain overload and a contributor to the buildup of supplies at airports.
Another cause for the bottleneck of the relief efforts at the airport was that the countries that were hit with the tsunami were underdeveloped and were not geared towards the type of operations that were needed for the relief efforts. For instance, an airstrip was forced to shut down when one of the loaned 747 freighters that were bringing medical supplies struck a herd of cattle (Hoffman, 2005). With already limited places to land, it became even more difficult when the airstrip closed as it was crucial for the delivery of medical supplies, food, and sanitation equipment.
The lack of preparedness, the initial phase of disaster response, was also noticed during the relief efforts for the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The area was known for being a “hotspot” for earthquakes but still lacked the technology and infrastructure to alert the surrounding countries of South-east Asia of an oncoming tsunami; however, the technology did exist at the time (Mills, 2014). Aside from the technology and infrastructure, the knowledge of tsunamis amongst the residents and tourists in the region did not exist. For instance, when people seen the water starting to pull back out to sea – happens often with tsunamis due to the energy build up in the oncoming waves – they walked closer to the beaches to get a closer look (Mills, 2014). Thus, the people of the area were caught with total surprise due to the lack of knowledge and response plans, contributing to the large death toll from the tsunami. In addition to the lack of knowledge, and no detection system, the area also did not have protective infrastructure in place to mitigate the damage caused by tsunamis to the shoreline such as a breakwater (Symonds, 2015).
As one can see, there were problems at all phases of the disaster response logistics for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The lack of coordination, poor disaster preparedness, lack of large-scale humanitarian agencies, and supply movement created problems in a time of rapid need. The relief efforts were successful and aided hundreds of thousands of lives that were in deep need of help; however, the efforts could have gone smoother contributing to lessons to be learned from these relief efforts.
Alternatives
Looking back on the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster relief efforts, there are some processes and infrastructure, from a logistics standpoint, that could have been implemented that would have increased the efficiency of the relief operations. It is always easy to look back and see the things that should have been done, but with disaster response, looking back or lessons learned will make the disaster response more effective and efficient which will lead to the overall impact of a natural disaster in the future being reduced.
2005 Hurricane Katrina
Background
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana as a Category 3 storm. The hurricane caused severe flooding damage and had catastrophic effects to city of New Orleans (see Exhibit C), Louisiana, and along the coast of Mississippi (CNN, 2019). The tropical depression that rapidly transformed into Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005, and meteorologists quickly began to warn people of the Gulf Coast states that a major storm was expected to hit. By August 28, evacuations had begun across the region. The storm and its aftermath resulted in over 1800 lives lost. Financially, the total damages were an estimated $161 billion and insurance companies paid an estimated $41.1 billion on 1.7 different claims for damages to personal injuries, homes, vehicles, and businesses (CNN, 2019). This was a storm that affected the Gulf Coast states in unimaginable ways and would require substantial logistic operations both during and after the storm. But, despite the warnings and evacuation measures that were taken, no one was adequately prepared to deal with the destruction that Hurricane Katrina and its force would cause.
Problems in Disaster Response Efforts
In December 2004, the National Response Plan (NRP), a United States national plan, to respond to emergencies such as national disasters or terrorist attacks came into effect. It was anticipated that when Hurricane Katrina hit that this plan would be actioned to help with the devastation that the storm caused. Disaster-relief logistics requires the effective management of the needs and requests for help from victims, available supplies and donations, inventories that deteriorate, location of supplies, storage and transportation, coordination of relief and government organizations, and cost versus available resources (University of Arkansas, 2005). Although many of these factors of disaster relief were addressed, some experienced delays and failures, leaving ample room for lessons to be learned.
Major problems encountered during Hurricane Katrina disaster response were around situational awareness, damage assessments, and coordinating teams for operations. Each of these issues exhibits problems with the logistical response of this situation, specifically in terms of logistics assignments, location-distribution models, and distribution in disaster response.
A point emphasized in this situation was that local first responders are best suited for handling local emergencies, but what happens when the first responders are overwhelmed as they were in Hurricane Katrina (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006). Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed local, state, and national response groups due to the high amount of damage and need for various resources. On August 28, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed medical teams, search and rescue teams, management teams, rapid needs assessment teams, and food, water, and other basic necessity materials. However, given that Hurricane Katrina hit on August 29th, this was too late to begin the pre-deployment process (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006). This was a lack of planning as it did not provide enough time for any first responding group to adequately plan and prepare for the devastation that this storm would cause. The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina covered 92,000 square miles, creating serious problems in how resources and materials would be assigned to each area.
Due to the vast area that experienced devastation there quickly became shortages of commodities. The disaster plan that had been in place used an overly centralized logistics system. The high volume of requests and pleas for resources and materials caused the system to be overwhelmed by the requirements of the three large disasters. Prior to Hurricane Katrina striking, requests were being placed and calculations were being to determine what each state would require, but in the end the numbers calculated did not meet actual demand and each state did not receive what was anticipated. This resulted in officials asking for permission to purchase commodities from elsewhere to supplement those that were being provided by the implemented centralized system (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006). Local and national government and nongovernment agencies could not keep up with the requests or efficiently organize a distribution model to meet the demands. However, Wal-Mart, a successful business that had mastered transportation logistics and management of goods and supplies, quickly and efficiently responded to areas in need (University of Arkansas, 2005). Unlike the government, the company did not have a disaster plan in place but instead used their expertise in logistics and supply chain management to serve areas hit by such a horrible natural disaster. During this time of crisis, they were able to quickly shift their focus on help to deliver and distribution products to those in need. This ability to change direction and adapt to the environment and needs of people is what is needed during such disasters.
Recommendations
Based on the information presented above, it may be concluded that integrated logistics could become the best way to resolve the issue with logical and timely disaster responses. There are four recommendations related to integrated logistics that could help organizations across the world respond to emergencies in a much more efficient way. The first recommendation is to have every logistics facility prepared for both catastrophes and disasters – especially knowing that these two are not the same (Tatham & Rietjens, 2016). Therefore, the main reason for promoting integrated logistics as one of the solutions is that there is no personal perspective when it comes to emergencies. If an organization utilizes integrated logistics, it will be able to respond to disasters the quickest while also assessing the impact of the crisis on society.
Another important recommendation is to control opportunistic purchases and material convergence. The problem of convergence can be solved with the help of organizations that contribute much-needed supplies instead of focusing on getting rid of inappropriate, useless items that would not have been successful in the market (e.g., expired medications, wedding gowns, or any other similar goods) (Ransikarbum & Mason, 2016). Therefore, material convergence in integrated logistics should contain three key categories of goods: (1) high-priority shipments that are ready for consumption and distribution, (2) low-priority shipments that could be useful in the future, and (3) non-priority shipments that would not represent any value for the emergency area.
The third recommendation is to make sure that the civic society actively participates in response efforts and disaster management activities. Examples from Haiti demonstrate that improved networking could be one of the key elements of emergency response plans, as the local communities would have a chance to distribute critical supplies to survivors if logistics had any problem reaching the most distant and hardly accessible destinations (Kirac & Milburn, 2018). In a situation where there are no trucks available to transport the vital resources, the latter should not be piled up at the facility but distributed among the civic society in order to have community members transfer the goods to those in need.
The ultimate recommendation that goes in line with the idea of implementing integrated logistics is to harness social media and make sure that the local population gets informed about the critical conditions as soon as possible. The fact that social media emerged as one of the most potent instruments in the industry also shows that during disasters, it could be utilized to reach out to an infinite number of people promptly and at the same time (Bealt & Mansouri, 2018). The value of this recommendation is that some channels to access social media are available even when electrical power is out.
Implementation Plan
Four essential steps will have to be completed to implement integrated logistics properly and make sure it is apt for emergency responses. The first is to identify all the resources that should be present at every secure location. Every organization should have area maps, government agencies contacts, and other essential resources that could be helpful during an emergency. This would make the basis for the disaster management guides for every organization and give rise to the idea that logistics shall be at the forefront of disaster responses. There are multiple items that are of critical importance to the community, such as water, medication, and back-up communications that may not be transported by community members. Therefore, each secure location should have a list of essential resources that will be transported to the closest emergency site when necessary.
The next step in the implementation process would be to address the supply chain and establish all the critical facilities that are going to participate in the disaster response process. Accordingly, the organizations will have a chance to identify locations that need access to the vital resources the most and adjust the supply chain to the newly-found data. Even though the majority of solutions will vary based on the supply chain size, type, and reach, the idea here is to mitigate the differences in inventory management, communication systems, and channel design. This step is not organization-specific and only depends on a thorough supply chain analysis. In a situation where a supply chain is not disrupted easily, every player within the supply chain will be able to communicate with other stakeholders with no delays. This would speed up the process of trading goods and facilities, ensuring that logistics companies have access to emergency resources.
The third step would be to establish an adequate response time for each facility to access emergency resources and a sufficient transportation distance to identify the closest supply chain facilities. Given that emergency resources will be placed off-site, the team will have to decide on how much time they are going to need to reach emergency resources and transport them to the emergency area. At this point in the implementation plan, the current proposal is a sort of a constraint that is expected to help organizations determine the number of storage areas required to cover the supply chain (and possibly provide assistance to the nearby organizations if necessary). Secure site locations will be placed at an absolute minimum distance from each organizational facility (depending on the geolocation and socioeconomic conditions) to minimize transportation costs and save time during emergencies.
The last step would be to collect the data from the previous three stages of implementation and identify the required number of emergency resource facilities. After ensuring that the stakeholders and community are aware of the need to establish safe storage areas, the organizations will have to apply the decision model again to allocate resources appropriately – according to the needs of stakeholders and community members, respectively. The planning step is needed to prevent potential resource shortages during the actual disaster and investigate the performance of an integrated supply chain. Overall, an integrated supply chain would give organizations easier access to emergency resources while also attracting community members to transporting resources to the areas that cannot be reached with the help of trucks, cars, or other vehicles.
Conclusion
Events from the past two decades show that the majority of organizations are genuinely pushed toward renewed supply chain strategies that could minimize the impact of disasters on humanity. This means that external incidents are becoming the key reason for rethinking disaster management operations and ensuring that logistics are at the forefront of critical emergency decisions and inventory management policies. As the prior experiences have already shown, the vital objective is to maintain continuity throughout every stage of a disaster. The current research clearly demonstrates that integrated logistics may be the most up-to-date and comprehensive answer to the question of how to respond to emergencies and manage them.
In the case where an organization uses location science and develops a set of focal points reserved for secure storage areas, it will protect itself from being deprived of emergency resources even during the worst-case scenarios. This model is just one of the possible responses to disasters. The evidence presented within the framework of the current paper proves that supply chains should be prepared to swift decision-making during emergencies; otherwise, physical, human, and logical losses will not be evaded, and the area would suffer from a major crisis caused by the inability to convey essential resources and provide support to the population. It means that an integrated supply chain where local population is also considered as an asset would serve as the best response solution during emergencies.
References
Bealt, J., & Mansouri, S. A. (2018). From disaster to development: A systematic review of community‐driven humanitarian logistics. Disasters, 42(1), 124-148.
Cecchine, G., & Morgan, F., & Wermuth, M., & Jackson, T., & Schaefer, A., & Stafford, M., (2013). The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders. RAND Corporation. Web.
Hoffman, W. (2005). A Logistics Nightmare. Traffic World. Pg 10 – 12.
Kirac, E., & Milburn, A. B. (2018). A general framework for assessing the value of social data for disaster response logistics planning. European Journal of Operational Research, 269(2), 486-500.
Mills, A. (2014). Benchmarks: December 26, 2004: Indian Ocean tsunami strikes. Earth Magazine. Web.
Tatham, P., & Rietjens, S. (2016). Integrated disaster relief logistics: A stepping stone towards viable civil–military networks? Disasters, 40(1), 7-25.
Pallardy, R. (2010). 2010 Haiti earthquake. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Web.
Ransikarbum, K., & Mason, S. J. (2016). Goal programming-based post-disaster decision making for integrated relief distribution and early-stage network restoration. International Journal of Production Economics, 182, 324-341.
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