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Introduction
Aristotle, the substance is the ultimate reality; it does not correspond to other categories of being and is the classification of being upon which all other categories of being are founded. This statement is reinforced by the quote “… the old question—always pursued from long ago till now, and always raising puzzles— ‘What is being?’ is just the question ‘What is substance?’1. Additionally, Aristotle refers to substance as a fundamental actuality or as the substrate surface of all existent things2. He analyses the relationship between potentiality and actuality, defining substance as both procedural and material reality.
Aristotle’s View on Substance
Aristotle’s philosophy is a realistic one, meaning that all the entities that can be encountered in the world are real, hence, substantial. According to Aristotle, every substance is comprised of two aspects: matter and form. Therefore, Aristotle’s philosophy is often described as the theory of form. Form is that which gives the object or the subject, its being. Without participating in being or containing it, the being of an object is impossible. Besides that, Aristotle notes that all the real things contain the elements of change or in other words, elements of “becoming”3. Those elements are included in the part of the matter of substance. By this theory, the aspects of “being” and “becoming” are resolved by the notion that every individual thing contains both “being” and “becoming”.
Aristotle describes the substance as an ultimate actuality, which does not pertain to any other genre of being. In that matter, it is the classification of being on even though every other type of being is predicated. Aristotle also characterizes substance as an underneath actuality or as the substrate surface of all existent things.
Substance theory sometimes referred to as substance–attribute theory, is an ontological hypothesis that all objects are made of a substance and characteristics carried by but distinct from the substance. In this role, a substance can be referred to as the substratum or a thing-in-itself. Substances are ontologically independent particulars: they possess the capacity for self-existence4. Another often attributed trait to objects is their ability to change. Changes presuppose the presence of something before, during, and after the change. They can be conceived of as the characteristics of a substance that is tenacious in gaining or losing material. The term “attributes” or “traits” refers to objects that substances may represent5. Their carriers’ properties define them; they transmit messages about who they are.
The substance is a central notion in ontology or metaphysics. The number of substances or persons believed to populate, provide, or exist in the universe may be classed as monist, dualist, or pluralist. There is just one substance, according to monistic beliefs. Stoicism or Spinoza, for example, maintains monistic ideas, believing that pneuma or God is the world’s only essence6. These ways of thought are sometimes linked to the concept of immanence. The universe is made of two basic substances like Cartesian substance dualism of mind and matter according to dualism. Plato’s Philosophy and Aristotle’s hylomorphic classifications are both pluralist philosophies.
Megarian School of Formal Logic
Throughout antiquity, Aristotle’s and his followers’ logic was the dominant stream of thought. However, the second lineage of logic existed afterward, that belonging to Megarians and Stoics. Megarian school of philosophy was established in Greece at the start of the fourth century BC under Eucleides of Megara7. It is remembered more for its critique of Aristotle and its effect on Stoic reasoning than any affirmative statements.
As such, Megarians were proponents of the idea that a thing only is what it is. Hence, there was no hidden potential that a thing could hold besides its present nature. This notion can be explained by the example of a sitting man. Megarians believed that a sitting man would remain a sitting man unless the number of allies would be involved to bring the person into a standing position, making him a different thing – a standing man8. Those allies would include nervous excitations and their effect on muscles, which erect the body and bring its weight to a person’s feet. According to Megarians, when those allies are missing, the sitting person does not hold any potential of becoming anything other besides what he is.
Therefore, the argument of Megarians holds that things are only what they are in the present, and they cannot be valued as ones that hold all of the possible things they could be in the future. This notion contradicted Aristotle’s views on potentiality and things having more secret chambers of what they truly are outside of their present qualities9. For instance, a sweet thing remains a sweet thing even when it is not tasted. The difference between Megarians’ theories and Aristotle’s views is what is known as the potentiality versus actuality argument.
Comparison of Aristotle’s and Megarians Theories on Potentiality-Actuality
Aristotle answers to criticism of his distinction between actuality and potentiality in Metaphysics IX, chapter 3. Like the Megaric schools, some believe that a thing may act when acting but cannot act when not acting, e.g., that those not building cannot produce, but only those building can build. In Aristotle’s theory, things hold the potential of becoming another thing 10. For instance, an acorn has the potential of becoming an oak tree, and there are no other things, which would also possess this feature. Therefore, in Aristotle’s realistic sense, the oak tree is already in the acorn. Defining the acorn by the effects it may have in the future is essentially a potentiality.
However, actuality rejects the practice of defining things for their future effects. Megarians did not consider the future iterations of the thing real as it departed the understanding of reality from its actual state. A thing is never more than what it is right now. Potentiality reduces the actuality of a thing by undermining the current state of an item and deforming the perception of reality. Hence, potentiality pre-describes the thing by borrowing features of actors that might be affected in the future.
On the contrary, Megerians’ theory does not explain the change that happens between a sitting man and a standing man. The main limitation of actuality theory is that it attempts to identify the actual with the relational. Hence, what defines a sitting man is the number of allies involved in his posture and the objects that he sits on. If we admit that the sitting man is what it is, then there is no certainty that it can become a standing man. Megarians lacked the understanding that the man itself is relational, and what was pointed out by Aristotle is the statement that what we see is a man who has the potential of being both standing and sitting.
Merits of Aristotle’s Theory
With his views on potentiality and the argument with Megarians’ actuality views, Aristotle expanded the understanding of the substance and what it is. In his view, the substance is a combination of matter and form. However, the form can hold more implications, which Aristotle develops into a term called essence: “a given thing seems to be nothing other than its own substance, and something’s substance is said to be its essence.”11 The term of essence expands the possibilities of the definition of substance, hence, creating more potential for a thing to be more of what it is in the presence.
Summary
According to Aristotle, whereas physics (or basic sciences) is concerned with movable or changeable objects, metaphysics is preoccupied with immovable or unchangeable objects. Metaphysics is the first philosophy in that it seeks to define the essence of being, whereas the other schools of philosophy and science seek to define the classes (genera or species) of being. Aristotle contributed to the development of potentiality as he argued with Megarians, who were proponents of actuality theory. In Aristotle’s view, things were more than they were at the moment. In addition, Aristotle expanded the metaphysical understanding of substance as he defined it as containing form and matter. Those elements respond to the argument of “being” and “becoming” as according to Aristotle, each thing contains “being” in its form and contains “becoming” in its matter. As the result, Aristotle’s view on substance contributed to the realistic approach in philosophy and provided opposition to the previous schools of thoughts.
Bibliography
Aristotle. 2020. Metaphysics. [Place of publication not identified]: Ale Mar.
Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress.
Gill, M. L. (2020). Aristotle on substance. Princeton University Press.
Makin, Stephen. 2006. ARISTOTLE Metaphysics. CLARENDON PRESS OXFORD.
Weidemann, Hermann. 2017. “Potentiality and Actuality of The Infinite: A Misunderstood Passage in Aristotle’S Metaphysics (Θ.6, 1048B14-17)”. Phronesis 62 (2): 210-225. Web.
Footnotes
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Aristotle. 2020. Metaphysics. [Place of publication not identified]: Ale Mar, Z7 1028b3.
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Makin, Stephen. 2006. ARISTOTLE Metaphysics. CLARENDON PRESS OXFORD.
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Gill, M. L. (2020). Aristotle on substance. Princeton University Press.
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Aristotle. 2020. Metaphysics. [Place of publication not identified]: Ale Mar
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Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress.
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Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress.
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Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress., 128.
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Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress., 129.
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Weidemann, Hermann. 2017. “Potentiality and Actuality of The Infinite: A Misunderstood Passage in Aristotle’S Metaphysics (Θ.6, 1048B14-17)”. Phronesis 62 (2): 210-225. Web.
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Harman, Graham. 2009. Prince of Networks. Prahran, Vic.: Repress., 130.
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Aristotle. 2020. Metaphysics. [Place of publication not identified]: Ale Mar, Z.6, 1031a16.
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