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The Iraq War, also known as the Second Persian Gulf War, spanned from 2003 to 2011 and is one of the longest, largest, and most costly uses of the United States armed forces since the Vietnam War (Lieberfeld, 2005). A shallow perception of the war would discern that its origins are rather conventional, however, upon thorough analysis aspects of the invasion decision are relatively unprecedented. In particular, the extensive military involvement in an Arab or Muslim country (Lieberfeld, 2005). Despite this, the pre-emptive threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in conjunction with the wake of destruction left by the 2001 terrorist attacks remain fundamental to the justification of the war. Albeit, there appears to be a specifically profound incongruity between the rationalizations purported by the Bush administration – which later was exposed as deceptive and hollow – and the actual motives and causes (Hinnebusch, 2007).
Considering this, it is not conducive to supporting solely the traditional theoretical paradigms of realism and liberalism – which focus on “why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of actions are made” (Aydin, 2016). Constructivism, however, offers an alternative framework centering around “how threat perceptions…are socially constructed” (Aydin, 2016). It is not a theory per se, but an approach to social inquiry that assesses international decisions from a normative rather than rationalist perspective.
Constructivism suggests that material forces (i.e. weapons, oils, resources, etc) must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life (Hurd 2008, 301). In the context of the Iraq war, an explanation grounded in constructivism would contend that analysis exclusively at the systematic level is invalid. Thus, upon true construction, the threat of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ being held by the Iraqi government is not justificatory for the invasion. Instead, ‘non-material’ factors and socially constructed interests can be explored when interpreting what constitutes an enemy and, moreover, the reasoning behind the Iraq War.
The general premise behind constructivism is able to be comprehended by critically analyzing an unassuming observation made by Alexander Wendt – a pioneer of the constructivist approach. Wendt denotes that “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons” (Wendt 1995, 73). Within this astute observation lies nuances of constructivism’s distinguishing features, including its founding insights: the social construction of interests, criticism of materialism, the relationship between agents and structures, and its multi-dimensional rationale of anarchy (Hurd 2008, 298). Considering this, it can be recognized that North Korea is simply a placeholder; it is one name placed on the United States overarching criteria of an ‘enemy’. Subsequently, the constructs of Wendt’s observation demand an understanding of the archetypal hierarchy between the concept of friend and enemy. In this case, the ‘enemy’ is Iraq.
In order to gain insight into the causal relationship between the invasion of Iraq and the social construction of interest, a crucial question must be asked: how does a state conclude others as enemies? Constructivism, then, is a particularly applicable theoretical approach as it emphasizes the social and relational construction of what states are and, importantly, what they want (Hurd 2008, 299). A constructivist application negates the neorealist commitment to materialism where socially mediated beliefs are not autonomous forces. This approach is preferred as a purely materialistic perspective offers an insufficient explanation of what constitutes an enemy.
Constructivism suggests that material forces (i.e. weapons, oils, resources, etc) must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life (Hurd 2008, 301). In the context of the Iraq war, an explanation grounded in constructivism would contend that analysis exclusively at the systematic level is invalid. Thus, upon true construction, the threat of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ being held by the Iraqi government is not justificatory for the invasion. Instead, ‘non-material’ factors and socially constructed interests can be explored when interpreting what constitutes an enemy and, moreover, the reasoning behind the Iraq War.
The construction of state interests is “shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events” (Legro 2005, 4). Furthermore, actors acquire “identities” – role-specific understandings and expectations about self – “by participating in…collective meanings” (Wendt 1992, 397). State interests are consequential to these identities. As such, interests culminate in the ways in which an actor is influenced by their interactions with others and with their social environment (Hurd 2008, 303). This includes the drive for social recognition and prestige, the effects of social norms on interests and on behaviors, and, importantly, the desire to create norms that legitimize one’s behavior (Wendt 1999, ch.5; Hurd 2007).
Considering that the Iraq War began in 2003, it is evident that the tragic events of the 2001 terrorist attacks were still at the forefront of the strategic mindset. As such, a constructivist account would elucidate the notion that the U.S. went to war in Iraq because the dominant strategic cultural norm – seeking geopolitical stability through multilateral deterrence – was rendered obsolete by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Lauterbach 2011, 1). Thus, democratic change in Iraq is viewed by the presiding administration as commanding an international norm of hegemonic control utilizing unilateral preventative war. Consequently, the concept of proving the viability of this normative shift catalyzed the Iraq War. This is further elucidated by a larger-scale strategic vision promoting hegemonic democracy through force (Lauterbach 2011, 1). Though this endeavor appears to have failed, the administrative tactics were reliant on the enemy archetype in justifying the Iraq invasion, subsequently explicating a link between constructivist ideals and the U.S. decision.
Although constructivism provides vital insight, there are, as with any theoretical paradigm, limitations. The continuous evolution of norms through socio-political development creates a unique, but nevertheless unstable platform of reasoning. Thus, there is the potential for over-complication of events in place of a simplified version – provided generally by the classical realist approach. The constructivist approach does not imply a specific unit of analysis (Hurd 2008, 306). Thus, the process of social construction cannot be examined solely on forces or actors within any of the “levels of analysis conventionally used in international relations theory (Waltz 1959). Despite this disallowing the debate over which level is most pragmatic for a given conundrum, the emphasis on specific actors allows realism a more straightforward approach (Hurd 2008, 306).
The realist approach provides a de facto explanation that, regardless of its rigidity, sets the stage for other paradigms to build. This is highlighted throughout constructivism, particularly in the approach to an anarchical system whereby “anarchy is what the states make of it” and anarchy of “…friends differs from one of the enemies” (Wendt 1995, 78). It should be noted, however, that although realist and constructivist theories differ, there are specific aspects that complement each other and allow the evolution of socio-political academia. Therefore, when taken in congruence, the theories provide a deeper insight into explaining the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The ability to move beyond rationalist perspectives is explicated through a constructivist approach to the Iraq War. Thus, the main triggers are able to be explored objectively and thoroughly, analyzing the identity of the states and how they influence strategic cultural norms. Subsequently, the origins of the Iraq War were analyzed in a complex manner, allowing insight into the U.S. threat response system, both retrospectively and prospectively.
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